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Torts: Moss v. City of Oklahoma City Marks the Demise
of the General Tort Liability Release
I. Introduction
Under common law, a release of one joint tortfeasor effectively releases any other
potentially liable parties, irrespective of the releasor's intent.' Presently, however,
most courts and state legislatures have turned away from this rigid rule and have
implemented more equitable approaches to general liability releases. Nationally, the
approaches currently taken by the courts diverge into three separate rules: the
"complete bar" rule, the "specific identity" view, and the "intent" rule. Many state
legislatures have also spumed the harsh common law rule through the adoption of
various forms of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA).
Likewise, Oklahoma attempted to remedy the ill effects of the common law rule
by the enactment of title 12, section 832(H)(1) of the Oklahoma Statutes, which
provided that a release of one tortfeasor will not operate to discharge other
tortfeasors "unless its terms so provide."' Clearly, the intent of the Oklahoma
legislature in adopting this provision was to depart from the common law rule; yet
the Oklahoma legislature's intent in drafting the phrase "unless its terms so provide"
remained anything but clear. The evasive answer to this question prompted the
Oklahoma Supreme Court case of Moss v. City of Oklahoma City.3 Unfortunately,
the Moss court's unconvincing response to this question hardly seems to resolve the
issue of legislative intent and instead creates'a myriad of more disturbing questions.
This note reviews both the common law and modem approaches to general tort
liability releases. Further, by examining the past and present approach of the
Oklahoma courts on such releases, this note will reveal the inconsistencies of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's recent decision in Moss. Finally, this note discusses the
unfortunate ramifications that will likely flow from the Moss decision.
I. Common Law Approach to General Liability Releases
The early legal history surrounding general liability releases reflected a strict rule
that often had harsh consequences on an injured plaintiff. Based on the formalistic
view that a release extinguished the cause of action to which it was related, the
common law rule provided that a release of one joint tortfeasor released all other
liable parties, regardless of the intent of the parties.4 In keeping with this rule, at
common law, a release by an injured person to one party acted to release all
1. See Western Express Co. v. Smeltzer, 88 F.2d 94, 95 (6th Cir. 1937).
2. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 832(H)(1) (1991) (amended 1995). The 1995 amendment to section
832(H)(1) substituted "unless the other tort-feasor is specifically named" for "unless its terms so provide."
See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 832(H)(1) (Supp. 1995).
3. 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995).

4. See id. at 283.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:555

prospective tortfeasors, absent a statement in the release indicating otherwise!
Courts that followed the common law rule rationalized that, where multiple
tortfeasors collectively caused an injury, the act of one became the act of all; thus,
each participant could be held liable for the plaintiffs entire loss.' However, critics
soon reproached the severe common law rule on the ground that it yielded harsh
results without any rational basis.7 More specifically, some courts rejected the
common law view because it-forced an injured party to forfeit his entire claim
against another without full compensation.!
In response to the harshness of the common law rule, courts departed from this
rule and sought less stringent alternatives. Certain courts alleviated the severity of
the common law rule by creating the option that an injured party could enter into
a covenant not to sue with a tortfeasor instead of signing a release relieving the
tortfeasor from further damages.' Additionally, other courts softened the common
law rule by treating a release containing a reservation of rights against another as
a covenant not to sue, which would not release all other potentially liable parties."0
Moreover, state legislatures also withdrew from the common law rule by enacting
statutes modeled after the UCATA." In 1978, the Oklahoma legislature incorporated part of the UCATA into title 12, section 832 of the Oklahoma Statutes. "
Significantly, Oklahoma amended its version of the UCATA in 1980, adding the
provisions of sections 832(H)(1) and 832(H)(2):
H. When a release, covenant not to sue or a similar agreement is
given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the
same injury or the same wrongful death:
1. It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for
the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces
the claim against others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the
release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for
it, whichever is the greater; and
2. It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all liability
for contribution to any other tort-feasor."

5. See All-American Bus Lines v. Saxon, 172 P.2d 424, 428 (Okla. 1946) (recognizing common
law rule, but refusing to follow it).
6. See, e.g., Neves v. Potter, 769 P.2d 1047, 1049-50 (Colo. 1989).
7. See Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 461 N.E.2d 361 (II1. 1984).
8. The Ohio Supreme Court succinctly criticized the common law by recognizing that:
The injustice of the traditional rule was that it frequently acted to extinguish a cause of
action which was only partly compensated, even though the parties themselves had no

such intention. Th. rule also made it very difficult for a claimant to settle a claim by
partial settlements with several persons who were jointly liable for his injury.
Whitt v. Huchison, 330 N E.2d 678, 681 (Ohio 1975).
9. See Moss, 897 P.2d at 283.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See id
12 U.L.A. 57 (1975).
See Act of Mar. 23, 1978, ch. 78, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws 142.
12 OKLA. STAT. f 832(H) (1991) (emphasis added) (amended 1995). See supra note 2.
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In fact, the significance of the Oklahoma legislature's addition of section
832(H)(1) cannot be overstated, as this provision presented the Oklahoma Supreme
Court with the task of determining the effect of the provision on a general liability
release. This issue sparked the Moss case and marked the end of the general
liability release in Oklahoma. While this specific question proved to be one of first
impression for the Moss court, Oklahoma law prior to section 832(H)(1) was well
settled. Indeed, examination of Oklahoma law prior to the amendment makes the
Moss decision that much more startling.
Oklahoma Law Prior to the Case

I.
4

In Brown v. Brown, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a release discharging a named person, coupled with language purporting to release all other
persons, precluded the plaintiff from thereafter suing any other parties." In Brown,
the plaintiff signed a release relieving a named person and "all other persons, firms
or corporations who are or might be liable, from all claims of any kind or character"
arising from an automobile accident in which plaintiff was involved. Subsequently, the plaintiff attempted to sue the defendant on a cause of action arising out of
that accident. Finding that the release operated to release the defendant from any
claims, the trial court dismissed the suit. 7 Plaintiff appealed, contending that she
did not intend to release the defendant from liability, and that neither the defendant
8
nor any other person paid consideration for the release.
The Brown court held that the plaintiffs release discharged all persons who might
9
have been liable from all claims resulting from the accident. In its reasoning, the
Brown court cautioned that to hold otherwise would disregard the plain language of
the release. Further, the court emphasized that the plaintiff did not assert that she
2
signed the agreement under any sort of fraud or duress. Thus, the Brown court
found that neither the plaintiffs failure to be fully compensated for her claim nor
the plaintiffs allegation that she did not intend to release the defendant relieved the
plaintiff of her responsibility for the plain language of a release which she
admittedly freely executed.' Clearly then, the Brown decision demonstrates that,
absent special circumstances such as fraud or duress, the determination of the
parties' intent should be drawn from a reasonable interpretation of the four comers
of the instrument.
Although the question of the Oklahoma UCATA's effect on general liability
releases had not been decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court prior to Moss, the

14. 410 P.2d 52 (Okla. 1966).
15. See id. at 57.

16. Id. at 55.
17. See id.

18. See id.
19. See id. at 57.
20. See id.
21. See id.

22. See id.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided this precise issue in
Mussett v. BakerMaterial Handling Corp.' The Mussett court recognized that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court had not specifically ruled on the effect that the adoption
of the UCATA had on general releases.' However, in fashioning its interpretation
of Oklahoma law, th- Tenth Circuit relied on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's earlier
decision in Brown, which upheld general releases. Following Brown's lead, the
Mussett court concluded that the Oklahoma UCATA did not prohibit an injured
party from broadly contracting to release all named and unnamed tortfeasors.'
In Mussett, the plaintiffs signed a release discharging "all ... persons, firms, and
'
corporations, both known and unknown, of and from any and all claims."26
After
the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' subsequent suit against the defendant, the
plaintiffs appealed on two grounds. First, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court
should have allowed the introduction of parol evidence to determine the intent of
the parties." Second, the plaintiffs contended that the above provision did not
effectively release the defendant under Oklahoma's UCATA. 2
Addressing the plaintiffs' first argument, the Mussett court held that when a
release shows no ambiguity, the court must interpret the contract as a matter of law
and must not look beyond the contract." Finding no ambiguity in the plaintiffs'
release, the Mussett court refused to consider extrinsic evidence to discern the intent
of the release." The Mussett court then turned to the plaintiffs' contention that the
UCATA limited the binding effect of a release only to those parties specifically
named in the release. In response, the court opined that the Brown decision,
upholding general releases, controlled the interpretation of the release, notwithstanding the adoption of the UCATA. 3 Indeed, the Mussett court ruled that the
Oklahoma legislature's inclusion of the language "unless its terms so provide"
clearly demonstrated that the statute did not limit the reach of the release only to
named defendants2 Thus, the Mussett court held that section 832(H)(1) did not
overrule Brown, and that the release executed by the plaintiffs operated to release
the defendants from liability.3 Significantly, the Mussett court found that neither
Oklahoma case law nor legislative intent provided a basis to abrogate the binding
effect of general liability releases.'

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

844 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Oklahoma law).
See 1i at 762.
See id.
Id. at 761.
See id.
See id
See id at 762 (citing 15 OKLA. STAT. § 154 (1966)).
See id
See id
See idt
See id.
See id
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IV. Three CurrentApproaches to General Liability Releases
Plainly, the enactment of the UCATA has necessitated that many jurisdictions
consider the UCATA's impact on the validity of general releases. After reviewing
those cases that have considered this question, three different views appear: (1) the
"complete bar" rule; (2) the "intent" rule; and (3) the "specific identity" rule.35
A. Complete/Absolute/FlatBar Rule
According to the complete bar rule, the release of a named tortfeasor and all
other persons, firms, or corporations from any and all claims serves as a complete
bar to actions against an unnamed tortfeasor. Typically, courts which advocate
37
this rule base their decision on adherence to traditional contract principles. In
Hasselrodev. Gnagey,3 ' which espouses the complete bar rule, the court examined
the effect of Pennsylvania's adoption of the UCATA on the validity of general
releases?' In its decision, the Hasselrode court focused on the simplistic terms of
the general release,' which plainly purported to release any and all persons from
liability.4' Because an examination of the release itself indicated its breadth, the
intent of the parties must be gleaned from the language of the release.4 Emphasizing that the release could not have been more specific,43 the Hasselrode court
concluded that nullifying the general release would amount to "torturing, misconstruing, and in effect, rewriting the language of the release.""
Clearly, the complete bar rule gives broad construction to the statutory language
"unless the terms so provide." Likewise, those courts following the complete bar
rule generally do not permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence to determine the
intent behind an unambiguous release.45 Interestingly, the Oklahoma courts had
espoused this view for nearly thirty years," until the landmark decision of Moss.

35. See Moss v. City of Oklahoma City, 897 P.2d 280, 285 (1995).
36. See Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 172 A.2d 764, 765 (Pa. 1961).

37. See Moss, 897 P.2d at 284.
38. 172 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1961).
39. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides, inter alia: "A release by the injured

person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after ajudgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors
unless the release so provides ..... 12 OKLA. STAT. § 832(H) (1991) (emphasis added) (amended in
1995).
40. The language of the UCATA adopted in Pennsylvania provides that other tortfeasors were not
discharged "unless the release so provides," Moss, 897 P.2d at 284, whereas until 1995, Oklahoma's
UCATA used the language "unless its terms so provide" in section 832(H)(1), see 12 OKLA. STAT.
§ 832(H)(1) (1991) (amended 1995). This slight difference, however, holds no significance.

41. See Hasselrode, 172 A.2d at 765.
42. See id,
43. The release recited, inter alia, that plaintiff released defendant, and "any and all other persons,
claims. Id. at 764.
associations and corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not" from all

44. Id.
45. See Moss, 897 P.2d at 285.
46. This view was first reflected in Brown v. Brown, 410 P.2d 52 (Okla. 1966).
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Thus, the Moss court not only overturned many years of judicial precedent but also
turned away from the majority view47 of other jurisdictions.
B. The "Specific Identity" Rule
In sharp contrast to the complete bar rule, some courts follow the specific identity
rule. Those courts that apply this view construe the UCATA language "unless its
terms so provide" as requiring that the release name or otherwise specifically
designate the other tortfeasors in order to discharge all other potential tortfeasors
from liability." While the courts differ on what constitutes "specific identification,"
all courts agree that naming a releasee fulfills this requirement." These courts also
concur that, short of being named, a party must be referred to in the release in such
a manner that his identity is made manifest.'
Furthermore, the courts also make different policy arguments supporting the
u 5
specific identity rule. First, the court in Beck v. Cianchetti
' stressed that the
relative position of the parties should be considered when interpreting a release.52
For example, the Beck court noted the situation of an insurance company which had
prepared the release and presented it to the injured party, who had no familiarity
with the terminology of the release and did not recognize its legal implications.
Acknowledging that unsuspecting injured persons often sign such releases, the Beck
court held that the insurance company would have the burden of showing that the
plaintiff understood the release and intended to relieve the unnamed tortfeasors.1'
Also apparent from the Beck decision was the reasoning that legislatures adopt
the UCATA in order to mitigate the harsh effects of the common law rule.
Otherwise, the Beck court reasoned, there would have been no reason to enact the
UCATA.' In fact, Phe Beck court identified that the thrust of the language "unless
its terms so provide" was to retain the liability of tortfeasors and must therefore be
narrowly construed.5"
In Moore v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,' the Arkansas Supreme Court elaborated
on the virtues of the specific identity rule. The Moore court recognized that the
specific identification of joint tortfeasors as a condition precedent to their discharge
will insure that the intention of the parties is accomplished.n Moreover, the court
determined that such a rule greatly minimizes the possibility that unwary individuals

47. See Douglas v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791, 794 (Sth Cir. 1982) (noting that the majority
position holds that language releasing any and all persons in addition to the named parties satisfies the
requirement of the Uniform Act's language "unless the release so provides").
48. See Moss, 897 P.2d at 285.
49. See Mclnnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F. Supp. 943, 948 (D.R.I. 1986).

50. See id. at 949.
51. 439 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio 1982).

52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
at 420.
See id.
See id.
See id.

56. 773 S.W.2d 78 (Ark. 1989)
57. See id. at 81.
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will misunderstand the effect of a release.s Lastly, the Moore court pointed out
that the rule lent itself to fair play and easy application.59
C. The "Intent" Rule
The third view taken by the courts, the intent rule, provides that a general release
will discharge unnamed tortfeasors only if the parties who contracted the releases
specifically intended to do so. ' This view takes the middle road and holds that
language purporting to release all "persons, firms or corporations" does not
necessarily discharge all unnamed tortfeasors.6 ' Rather, such a release will only
serve as a general release if and to the extent that the parties who negotiated the
release intended it to do so.'
In Neves v. Potter,' the Colorado Supreme Court expounded on the intent rule
by addressing two issues. First, the Neves court decided whether the parties who
executed a general release intended to release all persons from liability. The court
then concluded that general issues as to material fact existed as to the parties' true
intent.' Second, the couirt confronted the issue of whether, as a matter of law, a
general release may ever effectively relieve all other potential tortfeasors from
liability. Just as the court's attention to the intent issue showed the court's
movement away from the complete bar rule, the court's answer to the second issue
demonstrated the court's reluctance to completely abrogate the binding effect of
general releases. Ultimately, the Neves court upheld the validity of such releases to
the extent that they exhibited the intent of the parties.
Justifying its adoption of the intent rule, the Neves court reasoned that this rule
most effectively accomplished the purpose and spirit of the UCATA by retaining
the liability of joint tortfeasors unless the releasing party intended to discharge all
claims.67 Focusing on intent, the court emphasized that, as a general rule of law, a
court has the duty to interpret an instrument to achieve the manifest intention of the
parties.' In determining the intention of the parties, the court must rely on "good
sense and the plain understanding of the words" and acts of the parties.69
Although generally a document should be interpreted from its four comers, such
an examination would not always reveal a party's true intent. Thus, the Neves court
acknowledged that the intent rule often necessitates the introduction of parol
evidence, which can be used to determine the intent of a party when litigation arises

58. See id.
59. See id.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See
See
See
769
See

Neves v. Potter, 769 P.2d 1047, 1049 (Colo. 1989).
Mclnnis, 625 F. Supp. at 957.
Neves, 769 P.2d at 1051.
P.2d 1047 (Colo. 1989).
id at 1051.

65. See id. at 1056.
66. See id. at 1053.

67. See id at 1055.
68. See id. at 1053 (citing Harrison Western Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1981);
Martinez v. Continental Enter., 730 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1986) (enbanc)).
69. See id
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between a party to a contract and a stranger thereto7 The Neves court noted that
this exception to the parol evidence rule reflected the disdain of the court toward
individuals who seek to capitalize on an agreement to which they were not a
party." The willingness of courts to admit extraneous evidence as to the intent of
the parties signified the most significant change from the complete bar rule.
An examination of the reasoning of those courts which have applied the intent
rule reveals that this rule largely stems from a rejection of both the complete bar
rule and the specific identity rule. Perhaps the Mclnnis court best summarized the
benefit of the intent rule over the alternative views when it concluded:
Whereas the fiat bar rule presumes that the releasor meant to discharge
the world, and the "specific identity" rule presumes that the releasor
intended only to discharge those persons or entities who are designated
in ... the instrument, the "intent" rule abandons both of these fictions
and permits &.e actual intent of the parties to control. '
It seems that the legal "fiction" of the complete bar rule arises from the view that
this rule precludes redress on the basis of a chance insertion of boilerplate wording
on a printed form.' Conversely, the legal fiction presented from the specific
identity rule stems from the presumption that only specifically enumerated parties
escape liability. Thus, it appears that the intent rule originated largely from attempts
to dispense with thase legal fictions. Ironically though, the intent rule, with its
emphasis on parol evidence, allows for its own legal fictions as parties will
inevitably introduce evidence after the fact that does not at all reflect their intentions
at the time of signing.
Aside from these criticisms, those courts advocating the intent rule have also
founded their decisions on seemingly analogous decisions by the United States
Supreme Court. The Neves court noted that the Supreme Court has scorned rules
which give broad preclusive effect to release agreements.74 For example, in Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.," the Supreme Court ruled that in the
antitrust area a party releases only those parties whom he intends to release.76
Likewise, in the intellectual property realm, the Court adopted the intent rule for
patent infringement cases.' Therefore, although the Supreme Court has never
opined about the effect of a general tort liability release, courts have nonetheless
utilized Supreme Court decisions to buttress their adoption of the intent rule.

70. See id. at 1054 (citing Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963); American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Nicholas, 124 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1941); Continental Trust Co. v. Johnston, 188
P. 1112 (Colo. 1920)).

71. See id.
72. Mclnnis, 625 F. Supp. at 949.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See
See
401
See
See

id. at 954-55.
Neves, 769 P.2d at 1055.
U.S. 321 (1971).
id. at 347.
Am Mfg. C). v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S. 476, 500 (1964).
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V. Statement of the Case
In June 1989, Bryan Moss rode in a vehicle driven by Chasteen, which collided
with McBride.78 As a result of the collision, Moss died, and McBride sustained
injuries." After the accident, the Mosses (Appellants), the Roths, and the McBrides
filed claims with Chasteen's insurance carrier.' Appellants executed releases and
settled the claims for the amount of Chasteen's policy limit. Appellants settled the
claims for the amount of Chasteen's policy limit.8' The release signed by Appellants had Chasteen's name handwritten in blank spaces provided on the preprinted
release form.' Further, each form displayed language purporting to release:
any other person, firm or corporation charged or chargeable with
responsibility or liability... from any and all claims, demands,
damages, costs, expenses, loss of services, actions and causes of action
arising from any act or occurrence up to the present time, and particularly on account of all personal injury, disability, property damage, loss
or damages of any kind sustained ... in consequence of [the accident].'
In April 1990, Appellants sued Appellees (the City of Oklahoma City and
Mansur, Daubert & Strella, Inc.) for the negligent placement of a stop sign as well
as the negligent design and maintenance of the intersection where the accident took
place.' Appellees Mansur and the city separately moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the clear and unambiguous language in the release relieved them of
liability, even though they paid no consideration to Appellants for the release.'
The trial court granted summary judgment, ruling that as a matter of law the
release discharged all tortfeasors, named and unnamed.' Also, the trial court
concluded that parol evidence would not be admissible to determine the intended
scope of the release. Instead, the clear language of the release would governY
After the Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the effect of title 12, section 832 of the
Oklahoma Statutes on a general release purporting to release a named tortfeasor
along with all other potentially liable parties.
In its discussion of the case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Moss outlined the
three approaches to the UCATA's effect on general liability releases. After

78. See Moss v. City of Oklahoma City, 897 P.2d 280, 282 (Okla. 1995).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. Apparently the McBrides received $10,000, while the Roths received $5000 each. See
id. at 282.

82. See iU.
83. Id. at 282.
84. See id. Mansur, Daubert & Strella, Inc. allegedly designed the intersection, and the city allegedly

maintained it.
85. See id. at 283.
86. See id.
87. See i.
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considering these approaches, the court held that the specific identity rule best
effectuated the legislative purpose and design of the Oklahoma version of the
UCATA.' For that reason, the court adopted that rule as the law of Oklahoma.
Justifying its verdict, the Moss court emphasized its belief that the primary
purpose of statutory interpretation lies in ascertaining and following legislative
intent.' The Moss court then concluded that the Oklahoma legislature's intention
in enacting section 832(H)(1) was to apply the specific identity rule to general
liability releases.' In its reasoning, the court remarked that the legislature modeled
section 832 after the UCATA, which was enacted to preserve an unsuspecting
party's right to obtain relief from tortfeasors and a policy to prevent an injured
party's involuntary discharge of liable tortfeasors." Specifically, the court
explained:
[T]he plain meaning of the phrase "unless its terms so provide," coupled
with the preceding language of § 832(H)(1) that a release "does not
discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability" clearly contains an
expression of legislative intent that such other tortfeasors are not
discharged unless they are either named or otherwise specifically
identified in the release. 92
In its decision, the Moss court went beyond simply rationalizing the implementation of the specific identity rule. In fact, the court categorically rejected both the
complete bar rule and the intent rule. First, Moss rejected the complete bar rule by
stating that the rule failed to achieve the objectives of the UCATA and failed to
acknowledge the legislature's intention to abrogate the common law doctrine
espoused in Brown!' In the eyes of the Moss court, the complete bar rule would
perpetuate the legacy of the common law rule by releasing unnamed tortfeasors in
situations contrary to the releasing party's intent or where the releasing party did not
receive full compensation for his or her injuries." In sum, the court concluded that
the complete bar rule allowed joint tortfeasors who were not parties to a release to
enjoy a "windfall benefit" for which they did not bargain."
Perhaps more surprisingly though, the court also rejected the more moderate
intent rule. While the Moss court conceded that this rule would prevent a party
from unwittingly relinquishing a cause of action, the court opined that the Oklahoma
UCATA language did not lend itself to such an interpretation." After examining
the plain language of section 832(H)(1), the court found no indication that the

88. See id. at 287.

89. See id at 286 (citing Ledbetter v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 764 P.2d
172, 179 (Okla. 1988)).

90. See id
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id
Id.
See id at 287 (referencing Brown v. Brown, 410 P.2d 52 (Okla. 1966)).
See id

95. See id.
96. See id at 288.
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legislature meant to carve out a special exception to the parol evidence rule in the
case of general releases. 7 Lastly, the court noted that the intent rule could not be
easily applied but would require evidentiary hearings in nearly every instance when
a general release is challenged 8 Therefore, the court refused to sanction such a
view without a clearer indicia of legislative intent supporting the intent rule.
VI. Analysis of the Decision
A. Fundamental Change in Oklahoma Law
Oklahoma courts should immediately experience the impact of the Moss decision
as it diverged greatly from previous rulings regarding general liability releases. By
adopting the specific intent rule, the court dramatically changed the law by
overturning nearly thirty years ofjudicial precedent established by the 1966 decision
in Brown v. Brown.9 Following the Oklahoma legislature's adoption of the
UCATA, Brown's absolute bar rule still prevailed in the Tenth Circuit's 1988
decision in Mussett v. Baker MaterialHandling Corp.'" Undoubtedly, Moss marks
a significant reversal in Oklahoma which should have far-reaching effects.
B. ContractualImplications
Clearly, the Moss decision will have significant contractual ramifications. Under
Oklahoma law, a release agreement constitutes a contract.'"' Further, according to
traditional contract principles, a contract should be interpreted from the four corners
of the document." Thus, pursuant to the most fundamental elements of contract
law, a general release should be interpreted on its face. In Moss, the court
completely abandoned this principle. More importantly though, the court set such
releases aside in the absence of any equitable concerns such as fraud, duress, and
incompetency.
To the contrary, Appellants in Moss signed a clear and unambiguous release
one that was not procured under any sort of fraud or misrepresentation. Appellants
were not misled, incompetent, or illiterate, nor were they unrepresented by counsel.
Quite the opposite, Appellants signed the releases on the advice of counsel.
Ironically, under the advice of that same counsel, Appellants were allowed to renege
on their decision. Perhaps the court in Buttermore v. Alquippa Hospital"°' best
summarized the astounding effects that the Moss decision can create:
If such a release can be nullified or circumvented, then every written
release and every written contract or agreement of any kind no matter
how clear and pertinent and all-inclusive, can be set aside whenever one

97. See id.
98. See id.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

410 P.2d 52 (Okla. 1966).
844 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1988).
See generally Moss v. City of Oklahoma City, 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995).
Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 172 A.2d 764, 764 (Pa. 1961).
561 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1989).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:555

of the parties has a change of mind or whenever there subsequently
occurs a change of circumstances which were unforeseen, or there were
after-discovered injuries, or the magnitude of a releasor's injuries was
- unexpectedly increased, or plaintiff made an inadequate settlement. It
would make a mockery of the English language and of the law ..
C. Determinationof Legislative Intent
The concerns of the Buttermore court reveal an additional problem flowing from
the Moss decision. Rather than focusing on the intent of the parties who signed the
contract, the Moss court appears to look only at legislative intent in interpreting the
release. As a result, plaintiffs may engage in "Monday morning quarterbacking"
with respect to any, contract into which he or she enters. Essentially, the following
sort of scenario could become commonplace: A plaintiff can sign a general release
in exchange for fair consideration, fully intending a complete settlement at that time.
Soon the plaintiff learns of the existence of another deep pocket. The predictable
result is a newly filed lawsuit, and a plaintiff who is not bound by his or her
voluntary entrance into a clear contractual agreement.
Further, a close analysis of the Moss decision reveals a flaw in the court's
reasoning. In its rationale, the Moss court relies heavily on the plain language of
section 832(H)(1) when interpreting the Oklahoma legislature's intent in drafting that
statute. 5 For example, although the court praised the positive features of the
intent rule, the court nonetheless declined to adopt it because it found no specific
language in section 832 indicating the creation of an exception to the parol evidence
rule."' Again, relying on the plain language of the Oklahoma UCATA, the court
concluded ,that the legislature clearly intended the specific identity rule. Yet, the
plain language of section 832 in effect at the time Moss was decided showed no
such intent. Indeed, prior to the 1995 amendments, nowhere in the language of
section 832 would one find a requirement that only those parties specifically
identified in the release will be discharged from liability."° Had the legislature so
clearly intended such a rule, it very easily could have included those selfexplanatory words in the statute.
In sum, the Moss court felt compelled to reject the intent rule because the court
found no language in section 832 which specifically advocated that rule. Instead,
the court concluded that the specific identity rule best represented the intention of
the legislature. Yet, the language of section 832 in effect plainly did not state that
a general release only applied to specifically named parties. In fact, the language
of section 832 espoused neither the intent nor the specific identity rule. Recognizing
this, the Moss couit's rejection of the intent rule and its adoption of the specific
identity rule based on the plain language of the statute is hardly reconcilable.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 735.
Moss, 897 P.2d at 286.
See id. at 288.
See supra notc 2.
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D. 1995 Amendment to Section 832(H)(1)
A determination of legislative intent goes to the very heart of the Moss decision,
especially in light of a dramatic change in Oklahoma law that became effective the
same day as the Moss decision. On May 23, 1995, the date on which the court
issued the Moss decision, the Oklahoma legislature amended section 832(H)(1) by
passing Senate Bill 277."° The amended portion of section 832 now provides that
"[A release] does not discharge any other tortfeasor from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless the other tort-feasor is specifically named."'"
Plainly, this amendment to section 832 reflects an adherence to the specific
identity rule espoused in the Moss decision. On its face, the passage of the new law
might seem to settle the issue of legislative intent. On the contrary though, the
amendment to section 832 has ignited more burning questions. First, the new law
raised the question as to whether the law of Moss and Senate Bill 277 should apply
retroactively or prospectively. Second, the legislature's motives behind amending
this law presented the issue of whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court wrongly
decided Moss. Indeed, these questions formed the basis for a Petition for Rehearing
which resulted in a typically swift denial by the court.1
E. Retroactive Versus Prospective Application
As to the first issue, the retroactive effect of Senate Bill 277 turns on whether the
legislature intended the amendment to substantively change the existing law or to
clarify original intent. Under Oklahoma law, only a clarifying amendment, i.e., one
which explains a vague law to more clearly reflect legislative intent, may have a
retroactive effect."' Thus, an amendment which makes a substantive change in the
law will only apply prospectively."' Appellees (City of Oklahoma City et al.)
argued that the legislature's amendment to section 832 substantively changed the law
and may only apply prospectively."' Appellees reasoned that the amendment
implemented a new requirement for liability releases by mandating that a person
must be specifically named in the release in order to be relieved from liability.""
Conversely, Appellants took the position that the legislature intended merely to
clarify its original intent, giving the amendment to section 832 retroactive effect."'
As evidence for this assertion, Appellants offered portions of a memorandum written
by Oklahoma State Senate attorney Mark H. Ramsey, which explains: "This bill

108. See Act of May 23, 1995, ch. 218, 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 871 (codified at 51 OKLA. STAT.
§ 832(H)(1) (Supp. 1995)).
109. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 832(H)(1) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
110. Rehearing denied June 28, 1995.
111. See Texas County Irrigation & Water Resources Ass'n v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 803
P.2d 1119, 1122 (Okla. 1990).
112. See id.
113. See Appellees Brief in Support of Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 4, Moss v. City of
Oklahoma City, 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995) (No. 76982).
114. See id
115. See Appellants' Response to Appellees' Petition for Rehearing at 3, Moss v. City of Oklahoma
City, 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995) (No. 76982).
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corrects a problem created by the Tenth Circuit in Mussett .... The decision in the
Mussett case ignores the history and interpretation of the Uniform Act which dates
back to 1939 .... This bill clarifies this issue and overturns Mussett . . .,,",
Unfortunately, aside from this memorandum excerpt, scarce evidence exists that
sheds light on the legislature's intent in amending section 832. Further complicating
the issue, the above memorandum stemmed from communication between Ramsey
and the bill's author, Sen. Gene Stipe. After recognizing that the "plaintiff-friendly"
bill was authored by a prominent Oklahoma plaintiffs attorney, the legislature's true
intent in passing the amendment seems that much more convoluted.
Without the benefit of clairvoyance, a true determination of the intent behind the
legislature's adoption of the original version of section 832 remains highly unlikely.
What can be predicted with certainty is the alarming results that may occur if the
principles of Moss and Senate Bill 277 apply retroactively. Once the specific intent
rule has retroactive effect, many past general liability releases would in effect be
voidable. As a result, Oklahoma courts could likely experience an unwelcome flood
of litigation. The only true limitation on the surge of potential lawsuits would seem
to be the expiration of the statute of limitations. In addition to placing a heavy and
unnecessary burden on courts' dockets, a retrospective application of the specific
identity rule unfairly burdens those parties who relied on general releases by forcing
them to litigate mtters that were thought to be long settled." 7 Unlike the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, other courts which have addressed the issue of
retroactive or prospective application have recognized this problem and have limited
their decisions to apply only prospectively. For example, in Alsup v. FirestoneTire
& Rubber Co.," the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that the "widespread
use of and reliance upon general releases to discharge all tortfeasors, including those
not specifically identified in the release, require that [the court's] decision be made
prospective in operation.""' 9
Thus, in deciding how to apply the amended Oklahoma law, the court would have
been better advised to follow the general rule. Normally, statutes are presumed to
operate prospectively.'" A party may rebut this presumption only "where the
purposes and intents of the legislature to give a retrospective effect is expressly

116. See id. (emphasi3 added).
117. In fact, the Moss decision has already impacted existing cases. On September 26, 1995, the

court overturned a general liability release in Cotner v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 903 P.2d 878, 879 (Okla.
1995). In Cotner, the appellant settled a wrongful death claim resulting from a plane crash. See id.
Representatives of the owrer and pilot of the plane agreed to pay the appellant $225,000. See id. The
court noted that the boilerplate language contained in the release violated the specific identity rule set
forth in Moss, thus the cou't held that the release did not release any parties not specifically named. See
id. Further, in Carmichael v. Belier, 914 P.2d 1051 (Okla. 1996), and in Shadden v. Valley View
Regional Hospital,915 P.2d 364 (Okla. 1996), the court applied and reaffirmed the specific identity rule
established in Moss.
118. 461 N.E.2d 361 (111.1984).
119. See id. at 364.
120. See Wickham v. Gulf Oil Corp., 623 P.2d 613,615 (Okla. 1981) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. City
of Anacortes, 578 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Wash. 1978)).
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declared or necessarily implied from the language used."'' Any doubt must be
resolved against retroactive effect." At best, the Oklahoma legislature's true intent
on this issue remains speculative. Also, no language in the amendment declares or
implies a retroactive intent. Therefore, in consideration of both public policy issues
and Oklahoma case law, the uncertainty surrounding the amendment to section 832
should have strongly weighed against any retrospective application.
F. Impact of Legislative Intent on the Moss Decision
A determination of the Oklahoma legislature's purpose in amending section 832
also bears on the correctness of the Moss decision. In their Petition for Rehearing," Appellees asserted that if the amendment requiring the specific identity of
released parties constituted a legislative act taken to make a substantive change from
the original statute, then the Moss court wrongly interpreted section 832(H)(1).
However, if the purpose of the legislature was to clarify the original statute, the
Moss court correctly interpreted the statute as espousing the specific intent rule.
According to Oklahoma law, a statutory amendment generally indicates legislative
intent to make a substantial change in the preexisting law. In keeping with this
general rule, the amendment to section 832 should have been presumed to have
made a substantive change in the statute. Consequently, the Moss court would have
misinterpreted legislative intent behind the original provisions of section 832. In
spite of this presumption, the Oklahoma Supreme Court swiftly denied Appellees'
Petition for Rehearing. The court's denial should cause no surprise, as it called for
the court to reject its own recent decision.
G. Economic Implications
Regardless of whether the Moss decision applies retroactively or prospectively,
the economic impact of the Moss decision will likely be felt by litigants. No longer
will a releasing party, enjoy the benefit of settling his claims against all tortfeasors
with the use of a simple boilerplate form. Instead, a releasing party will likely be
compelled to draft separate agreements with each potential tortfeasors with whom
he or she chooses to release from liability. The releasing party will then incur
additional unnecessary legal expenses.
Moreover, the implementation of the specific identity rule has already caused
concern in other jurisdictions for the negative influence it may exert on settlement
agreements. Indeed, the dissenting opinion in Alsup voiced the concern that:
the rigid requirement [of the specific identity rule] would discourage
settlement..'. [when] a tortfeasor who settles and executes a release is
barred from contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not
extinguished by the release. Unless all claims of a plaintiff are

121. Id.(emphasis added).
122. See Houck v. Hold Oil Corp., 867 P.2d 451, 457 (Okla. 1993).
123. See Appellees' Brief in Support of Joint Petition for Rehearing at 6,Moss v. City of Oklahoma
City, 897 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1995) (No. 76982).
124. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 113 F.2d 853, 856 (10th Cir. 1940).
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extinguished against all joint tortfeasors... a defendant will be
reluctant to settle, knowing that he surrenders a possible right to
contribution against some known or unknown unreleased tortfeasor.'"
Of course, whether the specific identity rule will have a similar effect on the
settlement of litigaition in Oklahoma presents yet another unanswered question
resulting from the Moss decision.
H. Summation of Analysis
In rendering its decision, the Moss court embraces the specific intent rule in the
face of many basic principles of law. First, the court undermines the premise that
a contract should be interpreted from its four corners, absent considerations such as
fraud or duress. In addition, the court gives no consideration to the intent of the
parties who signed the release in Moss. As a result, the court has injected more
uncertainty into the law of contracts. Essentially, the Moss decision provides another
avenue by which a clear and unambiguous contract may be set aside, notwithstanding the intent of the parties at the time of signing.
Second, despite the clarity of section 832, the Moss court provides an interpretation of legislative intent that opposes the plain language of the statute. Moreover,
the court arrived at this interpretation after providing virtually no authority for how
it reached this conclusion. Third, the court's failure to apply its decision only
prospectively poses the most disturbing result from the Moss decision. Even those
.parties who signed general releases, under the advice of counsel and with full
knowledge of their consequences, could have the opportunity to seek more
compensation for a once-settled claim.
Finally, the Mos.? decision could cause unwelcome economic impacts through
potential increases in litigation costs if release forms must be separately negotiated
and drafted. Moss may also impede the settlement process and necessitate costly
litigation. With these realizations in mind, the virtues of fairness and wisdom elude
the Moss decision.
VII. Conclusion
In enacting section 832, the Oklahoma legislature undisputedly intended to
reverse the harsh common law rule that a release of one tortfeasor automatically
released all other liable parties. Yet the Oklahoma Supreme Court's interpretation
of the language of section 832 has created a rule that is equally as severe as the
common law rule which section 832 sought to ameliorate. The Moss decision
implemented its own rigid rule that precludes any general release from releasing any
other tortfeasors than those specifically named in the release, even if the releasing
party intended otherwise.
The Moss court'; adoption of the rigid specific identity rule has produced
potentially disturbing ramifications. First, the Moss decision erodes the certainty of
contractual provisions. Even a fully informed party who signed an unambiguous
125. Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 461 N.E.2d 361, 367 (Ill. 1984).
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general release under the advice of counsel may now escape that voluntary
agreement. Second, a retroactiv6 application of the specific identity rule could cause
a surge of litigation of once-settled actions. Third, the Moss decision could heighten
litigation costs and decrease settlement opportunities. Thus, in its attempt to change
direction away from the vices of the common law rule, the court has taken a course
in Moss which presents its own distressing consequences.
Erika Blomquist
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